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Recession Transgressions: Financial Mishaps that Led to the Credit Crisis 
 
by Kyle Nemchek 
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ABSTRACT: This paper explores the financial crisis of 2007-2010 and its causes, including: 
questionable monetary policy, loose lending standards, the emergence of structured finance 
products designed to conceal the true risk of subprime loans, a lack of independence and due 
diligence on the part of credit rating agencies, and the failure of oversight bodies to properly 
monitor or regulate the parties responsible for the crisis.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I.  MONETARY POLICY & INTEREST RATES 
Easy money in the wake of the 2001 recession created an economic boom, but a 
sudden reversal of Federal monetary policy saw an increase in interest rates that 
left homebuyers unable to pay down their adjustable rate mortgages. 
 
II.  LENDING STANDARDS & SUBPRIME LOANS 
Government directives designed to increase homeownership, along with reduced 
lending standards and predatory lending practices, resulted in loans made to 
unqualified homebuyers who ultimately defaulted. 
 
III.  SECURITIZATION & STRUCTURED FINANCE 
Mortgage originators sold the loans to investment banks, which repackaged the 
notes into complex securities that appeared less risky than the underlying loans. 
Off-balance-sheet conduits effected uninformed investors who were punished 
when the component mortgages experienced defaults. 
 
IV.  CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
Professional rating companies may have lacked independence and objectivity, 
producing potentially biased and/or flawed analyses that failed to expose the true 
risk of mortgage-backed securities. 
 
V.  DEREGULATION & FEDERAL OVERSIGHT 
Federal oversight agencies did not adequately regulate the credit markets. Tools 
for monitoring and restraining speculative excesses were ineffective, underused, 
or repealed altogether.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Congress is currently debating a financial regulatory reform package intended to prevent 
the recent credit crunch, which is considered by many economists to be the worst financial crisis 
since the Great Depression and from which the United States and world economies are still 
recovering, from happening again. In order to develop a suitable mechanism for fixing the 
system, it is important to first determine what broke it. This paper attempts to accomplish that by 
identifying concrete actions taken by legislators, regulators, lenders, borrowers, investment 
banks, investors, and insurers that collectively contributed to the credit crisis. Below is a 
summary of the multiple causes of the near-collapse of the world financial system, which are 
discussed in more detail throughout this paper. 
 Governmental policies aimed at increasing homeownership and a subsequent reduction of 
lending standards across the board led to an explosion of new mortgage loans in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. Meanwhile, federal interest rate cuts designed to expand the availability of 
credit facilitated the use of adjustable rate and exotic mortgage products that concealed the true 
lifetime costs of the loans, while predatory lending practices and mortgage application fraud 
brought even more home loans to ill-equipped borrowers. Mortgage originators then sold the 
loans to government-sponsored enterprises and investment banks, which repackaged them into 
complex securities that appeared less risky than their underlying components. Unfortunately for 
investors, credit rating agencies had failed to accurately assess the quality of those securities, and 
their flawed ratings convinced major Wall Street firms to take highly leveraged positions, which 
had been made possible by a relaxation of capital reserve requirements and the repeal of 
financial regulation passed in response to the Great Depression. Meanwhile, an unregulated 
derivatives market permitted credit default swaps, which were effectively insurance policies on 
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mortgage-backed securities, to be traded profusely without sufficient collateral to cover losses. 
When interest rates reset, homeowners found themselves unable to pay back their loans. Lenders 
were left with houses that had decreased in value, investment banks and investors were stuck 
with securities that they could not unload, and sellers of credit default swaps discovered 
obligations that they lacked the capital to satisfy. With everyone looking to rid their portfolios of 
toxic assets and no one willing to purchase them, credit markets became illiquid, or frozen, 
resulting in what has become known as the credit crisis. 
 
I. MONETARY POLICY & INTEREST RATES 
In November 2002, then Governor and current Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben 
Bernanke, spoke at economist Milton Friedman‘s ninetieth birthday regarding the responsibility 
of central bankers for the Great Depression: ―You‘re right,‖ he pronounced, ―we did it. We‘re 
very sorry. But thanks to you, we won‘t do it again.‖1 Two years later in Washington, D.C. 
Bernanke discussed a phenomenon known as the Great Moderation, which referred to the 
substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility that had occurred over the previous two decades 
and for which he credited improvements in monetary policy.
2
 In hindsight, Bernanke‘s 
confidence in the skill of the central banking system to mitigate financial instability may have 
been misplaced, as even former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan admits, ―I do not 
doubt that a low U.S. federal-funds rate in response to the dot-com crash…may have contributed 
to the rise in U.S. home prices.‖3 Indeed, this section contends that easy money created by 
interest rate cuts in the wake of the 2001 recession triggered a housing boom, but a sudden 
reversal of federal monetary policy saw an increase in interest rates that left homebuyers unable 
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to pay down their adjustable rate mortgages and led to the widespread sale of real estate amidst 
declining housing prices. 
The 2001 Recession & the Federal Response 
 During the final years of the twentieth century, stock market participants invested heavily 
in Internet-based startups. In hindsight, experts have criticized investors for failing to evaluate 
these companies in terms of traditional market criteria like profits or positive cash flow and for 
speculating that technological advancements would lead to future returns on a massive scale as 
part of a high-tech revolution known as the ―new economy‖.4 By the spring of 2000, equities 
comprised sixty-percent of the financial assets in American households, representing the largest 
exposure of individual investors to the stock market since September 1929.
5
 But when profits 
ultimately failed to materialize, the dot-com bubble burst. Plunging technology stocks wiped out 
hundreds of billions of dollars in market capitalization, and layoffs and bankruptcies became 
commonplace across the e-commerce spectrum.
6
 To add to the devastation, the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 inflicted heavy financial damage throughout the travel, tourism, 
entertainment, and insurance industries while increased shipping, security, and insurance costs 
permeated most sectors of the economy.
7
 
One way in which the Federal Reserve can respond to a worsening economic situation is 
by decreasing its target for the federal funds rate, the interest rate at which financial institutions 
lend balances to one another, which the Federal Reserve can influence through the use of open 
market operations.
8
 Lower interest rates make it easier for people to borrow in order to buy cars 
and homes. Purchases of homes, in turn, increase the demand for other items, such as furniture 
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and appliances, thus providing an additional boost to the economy. What‘s more, rate reductions 
mean that consumers spend less on interest costs, leaving them with more of their income to 
spend on goods and services.
9
 Accordingly, the Federal Reserve cut its federal funds rate target 
eleven times over the course of 2001 from 6.5% to just 1.75%.
10
 Releases from the Federal Open 
Market Committee cited concerns of tight conditions, lower consumer confidence, a persistent 
erosion in current and expected profitability, slower growth abroad, and unusual forces 
restraining demand, which collectively ―called for a rapid and forceful response of monetary 
policy‖.11 But when economic recovery proved sluggish, the Federal Reserve continued to 
decrease interest rates, lowering the federal funds rate target to 1.25% in November 2002 and to 
1% in June 2003, where it remained for a year.
12
 
Policy Criticism, Yield Curves & the Taylor Rule 
 Some observers questioned whether such aggressive policy measures were wise and 
whether record-low interest rates could instigate a massive borrowing boom.
13
 Bernanke himself 
acknowledged that policymakers worried that the sudden massive drop in rates limited the scope 
for further monetary accommodation as the target interest rate approached its zero lower 
bound.
14 
Further concern arose regarding the elevated degree of intervention, given that the 
recession from March to November 2001 was short and mild and was only denoted a recession 
due to the final contraction in economic activity caused by the world trade center attacks.
15
 In 
fact, despite significant job losses in the year‘s last quarter, Yale professor William D. Nordhaus 
termed the downturn ―the Mildest Recession‖, showing that in comparison to previous economic 
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slumps, the negative growth for 2001 is almost indiscernible and is unmistakably the smallest 
downward spike of any postwar recession.
16
 
 Another indication that the need for mediation may have been less than in prior 
recessions was the favorable operating environment enjoyed by banks, as evidenced by yield 
curves. The term yield curve refers to the relationship between the interest rates of short-term 
and long-term fixed-income securities issued by the U.S. Treasury. Typically, short-term debt 
instruments have lower yields due to the risks associated with time inherent to long-term 
instruments. This leads to positive yield spreads and an upward sloping, or normal, yield curve, 
which can suggest a positive long-term economic outlook.
17
 Because a bank‘s assets tend to have 
longer maturities than its liabilities, a drop in short-term rates and the resulting steepening of the 
yield curve enables banks to decrease borrowing costs and improve margins. In the 2001 
recession, the yield curve steepened quickly and early. Its slope increased by 37% more in the 
first quarter than during the same period of the 1990-91 recession, confirming that the interest 
rate environment was more favorable for banks at the beginning of the 2001 downturn than it 
was at the start of the prior recession and suggesting that such an aggressive federal response 
may not have been warranted.
18
 Nevertheless, despite the tameness of the downturn, the 
economy received the biggest monetary and fiscal boost in its history.
19
 
 Stanford economist John Taylor was also vocal in opposing the actions of the Federal 
Reserve based on a monetary policy rule of his invention that stipulated how much the central 
bank should change interest rates. The Taylor Rule, which had been based on policy evaluation 
experiments, recommended that the Federal Reserve increase its federal funds target when the 
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current inflation rate exceeded policymakers‘ longer-term inflation objectives or when current 
output (usually real GDP) exceeded its potential.
20
 The actual federal funds rate, however, fell 
beneath the values prescribed by the Taylor Rule by an average of 200 basis points from 2002 to 
2006.
21
 Taylor would later write that interest rates were ―well below known monetary guidelines 
that say what good policy should be based on historical experience‖, contending that keeping 
interest rates on the track that had worked well in the previous two decades would have 
prevented both the initial boom of home values and the ultimate housing bust.
22
 
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages & the Housing Bubble 
 Whereas previous housing expansions have been attributed to increases in housing 
demand or technological progress, the increased impact of monetary policy on home prices this 
time around was due in part to changes in the methods of housing finance.
23
 Because federal 
rates feed through to monthly mortgage payments more directly when the mortgage interest rate 
is adjustable and tied to short-term rates, a rise in popularity of adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) 
products may have rationalized a stronger effect of monetary policy on house prices.
24
 An ARM 
is a loan with an interest rate that changes periodically, usually in relation to an index. Lenders 
typically charge lower initial interest rates for ARMs than for fixed-rate mortgages, but such 
teaser rates are only valid for a limited time, and a borrower‘s payment may increase or decrease 
due to changes in market rates after the initial discounted rate expires.
25
 Based on a tabulation of 
average interest rates for prime borrowers from 2003 to 2006, as calculated by Freddie Mac, the 
initial monthly payment was about 16% lower for ARMs than for fixed-rate 30-year mortgages. 
Other, more exotic variations on the ARM, such as interest-only ARMs (resulting in an 
                                                     
20
 Orphanides 
21
 ―The Target Federal Funds Rate‖ 
22
 ―How Government Created the Financial Crisis‖ 
23
 Iacoviello & Neri 
24
 ―Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble‖ 
25
 ―Consumer Handbook on Adjustable-Rate Mortgages‖ 
7 
 
unchanged outstanding loan balance each month), negative amortization ARMs (in which the 
initial payment did not even cover interest costs, thereby increasing the loan balance each 
month), and pay-option ARMs (which gave the borrower considerable flexibility regarding the 
size of monthly payments in the early stages of the contract) offered more striking comparisons 
between ARMs and fixed-rate mortgages. Whereas the initial monthly payment of a standard 
ARM represented 83.7% of a fixed-rate mortgage payment, the initial monthly payments of 
negative amortization and pay-option ARMs constituted, at the onset, just 13.9% or less.
26
 The 
attractive terms led to a surge in popularity of ARMs, which comprised just eight percent of 
conventional loans in early 1981 before making up 36.6% of mortgages by March 2005.
27
  
 Were homebuyers blindly ignoring the impending resets of obviously impermanent teaser 
rates? Not exactly, argued Yale professor Robert Shiller: ―People who bought ARMs realized 
that interest payments would go up after some time. But they were not deterred because they 
thought they would be compensated by rapidly increasing home prices and would be able to 
refinance their mortgages at a lower rate.‖ Shiller advanced that lenders, too, believed in the 
bubble, thus all-around ―irrational exuberance‖ led to an unsustainable buildup of already 
elevated housing prices.
28 
Hence, after growing by a mere 8.3% from 1990 to the first quarter of 
1997, home prices began a rapid ascent, peaking in the second quarter of 2006 at a level 132% 
higher than at the start of 1997.
29
 Homeownership levels made a similar climb. Throughout the 
three decades leading up to 1995, the homeownership rate fluctuated between 62 and 64 percent, 
with little discernable trend, but jumped to 69% over the next ten years. Growth in 
homeownership was so pronounced that during the same period, the amount of renters in the 
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United States declined for the first time since World War II. This fact would be striking enough, 
but also telling is that per capita income grew less during the spike than during the 1960s and 
1970s.
30
 With incomes lagging and with trillions of dollars of ARMs scheduled to reset in 2007 
and 2008, consumers were sure to face exploding monthly payments.
31
 
The Recession 
 Nevertheless, reassured by apparently robust productivity growth, the Federal Reserve 
initiated a series of increases to its federal funds rate target, reversing the recent cuts almost as 
quickly as it had enacted them.
32
 Over two years from June 2004 to June 2006, the federal target 
rose seventeen times from 1% to 5.25%.
33
 During that time, the previously discussed yield curve 
became increasingly flat, as observed by Federal Reserve economist Jonathan H. Wright, who 
noted that inversion of the curve is thought of as a harbinger of a recession.
34
 While Wright did 
not seem to think that the flatness heralded a sharp slowdown at the time of his writing, the 
short-term federal target ultimately exceeded long-term yields, and the slope of the curve entered 
negative territory by the end of the year. Princeton economist Paul Krugman used models from 
Wright‘s research to show that as of December 1, 2006, the probability of a recession occurring 
during the next four quarters was between 68 and 74 percent,
35
 although Bernanke ―would not 
interpret the currently very flat yield curve as indicating a significant economic slowdown to 
come‖.36 The United States economy entered a recession a year later.37 As the short-term interest 
rate returned to normal levels, housing demand fell rapidly. Delinquency and foreclosure rates 
then rose sharply. Real GDP was flat in 2008, unemployment reached 9.5% the following 
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summer, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 55% from its peak of 14,279.96 in 2007 to 
6,440.08 on March 9, 2009.
38
 
 
II. LENDING STANDARDS & SUBPRIME LOANS 
While housing prices were still increasing and homeownership was exceeding record 
levels, mortgage lenders looked to earn additional profits by seeking a new type of customer: less 
qualified homebuyers to whom credit was previously unavailable but who were willing to accept 
higher interest rates and fees in order to secure a home loan. Government directives designed to 
increase homeownership among poor and minority Americans provided further incentive for 
lenders to weaken their traditional lending standards. The reduced standards, in conjunction with 
certain predatory lending and borrowing practices, resulted in growing numbers of loans made to 
unqualified or subprime homebuyers who ultimately defaulted. 
Past Governmental Policies & Housing Discrimination 
Homeownership had long been considered the foundation of neighborhood stability and 
long-term wealth accumulation, thus governmental policies historically encouraged 
homeownership by allowing taxpayers to deduct mortgage interest payments and state and local 
real estate taxes from their incomes. But the government became much more directly involved in 
promoting the American Dream when concerns regarding discrimination of traditionally 
―underserved‖ populations in the mortgage market came to light.39 In 1977, for example, the 
Community Reinvestment Act required banks to conduct business across their entire geographic 
operating areas, preventing the pursuit of customers in a suburb while neglecting a downtown 
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area.
40
 Such measures were deemed insufficient, however, when a 1992 study by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston concluded that race still played a significant role in lender decisions.
41
 
Shortly thereafter, the Boston Fed distributed to loan originators a guideline for equal 
opportunity lending with best practices designed to ―close the mortgage gap‖. Several telling 
recommendations included in the guide seemed to indicate the lax direction that lending 
standards would soon take: It was advised that property standards and minimum loan amounts be 
checked for ―arbitrary‖ rules that might negatively affect applicants. Consideration should still 
be given to applicants with obligation ratios significantly above industry standards. Lack of 
credit history ―should not be seen as a negative factor‖, and the calculation of income should 
even include temporary funding sources such as unemployment benefits and welfare payments.
42
 
Serving Two Masters: Government-Sponsored Enterprises 
 To ensure the increased availability of credit to un-creditworthy persons, regulators 
placed pressure on government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) including the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac). Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac were stockholder-owned, for-profit businesses erected by 
Congress to help provide liquidity in secondary mortgage markets by purchasing mortgages from 
loan originators. Because secondary mortgage markets can increase the availability of credit and, 
consequently, the rate of home purchases, the GSEs could assist the government in achieving its 
stated goal of bolstering homeownership. As a result, Congress chartered the organizations as 
government-sponsored enterprises, which meant that their bonds were backed by the federal 
government and that they could borrow funds at 50 to 75 basis points less than other private 
lenders. This cheap access to credit propelled Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac to success, and the 
                                                     
40
 Liebowitz 
41
 Bostic 
42
 ―Closing The Gap: A Guide to Equal Opportunity Lending‖ 
11 
 
share of all mortgages held by the firms rose from 25% in 1990 to 45% in 2001. But it also left 
them destined to ―serve two masters‖—both their shareholders, who desired profitability, and the 
federal government, which sought equality in lending.
43
 
 Eventually, the conflicting interests of these two principals became evident when the 
GSEs were called upon to significantly broaden access to mortgage credit, despite such an action 
potentially being fiscally unwise. The 1992 Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and 
Soundness Act (FHEFSSA) mandated that Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac increase their acquisition 
of loans made to low-income borrowers and in areas underserved by private mortgage credit 
institutions. Fannie Mae responded by announcing a trillion-dollar commitment in 1994 to help 
10 million high-need families secure previously unattainable home loans as Freddie Mac pursued 
similar initiatives.
44
 
Subprime Lending 
The less creditworthy borrowers affected by FHEFSSA had, in the past, been largely 
relegated to the subprime lending market, which often charged higher interest rates and mortgage 
fees than those assessed to prime borrowers. Moreover, GSEs were only permitted to purchase 
prime loans on the secondary market, which meant that less money was available to mortgage 
originators who extended credit to subprime debtors and that lenders were less willing to target 
those borrowers.  Distinctions between prime and subprime mortgages were evidenced by the 
criteria for ―conforming‖ mortgages that could be purchased by Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac. A 
conforming loan must have been made to a mortgagor with a FICO score above 660 (compared 
to the low 600s or 500s for subprime), the loan-to-value ratio must have been less than or equal 
to 80% (compared to close to or equal to 100% for subprime), the mortgagor‘s debt-to-income 
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ratios must have been less than 28/36% (compared to 50% or more for subprime), and there must 
have been appropriate documentation and verification of the mortgagor‘s income and assets 
(compared to little or none for subprime).
45
 
Increasing Government Influence on Lending Practices & Standards 
 To reduce the perceived neglect of subprime borrowers, legislators set their sights on 
private banks through a 1995 strengthening of the Community Reinvestment Act. This revision 
established objective criteria for determining whether a bank was adequately and equitably 
providing credit to low-income earners. While in the past it had been sufficient for lenders to 
demonstrate ―elaborate community lending efforts‖ (that they were searching for qualified 
borrowers), banks were now obliged to prove ―an evenhanded distribution of loans‖ (that they 
had actually issued a specified amount of requisite mortgages) across all income levels.
46
 If a 
bank failed to adhere to the new requirements, it could face direct legal challenges from the 
Justice Department.
47
 As it turns out, many lenders discovered that the heightened commitments 
were actually a boon to business. Countrywide Financial, for instance, used the Act revision as 
an excuse to lower its underwriting standards and accept more credit applications.
48
 By 2000, it 
would become the number one lender to minorities in America.
49
 
Another governmental incentivizing of widespread credit availability appeared in the 
form of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Beginning in 
the mid-1990s, HUD commenced even more increases to the percentage of mortgages to low-
income households that Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac were required to hold in their portfolios. In 
1996, the amount of new loans to be purchased by GSEs that had been issued to borrowers with 
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incomes below the median was set at 40%. That level increased to 50% in 2000 and to 56% by 
2008.
50
 
Of course, banks and GSEs could not service these low-income borrowers by simply 
offering traditional loans in larger numbers, for as discussed, Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac could 
only purchase mortgages that conformed to certain standards regarding down payment and 
income requirements, which mortgages issued to low-income households generally did not meet. 
As the mandatory share of low-income mortgages increased, however, GSEs relaxed their 
standards so that the new loans could be considered as conforming. Subsequent HUD edicts 
required GSEs to accept loans with smaller down payments and larger loan-to-income and loan-
to-value ratios. These changes represented ―a new generation of affordable, flexible, and targeted 
mortgages, thereby fundamentally altering the terms upon which mortgage credit was offered in 
the United States from the 1960s through the 1980s.‖51 
Evidence of Reduced Lending Standards 
Subprime loans expanded from 9% of the mortgage market in 1996 to 20% in 2006.
52
 
Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, meanwhile, purchased $1 trillion in subprime and Alt-A (―near-
prime‖ mortgages made to buyers that had less documentation or that possessed certain subprime 
characteristics) loans from 2005 to 2007, representing 40% of their mortgage purchases made 
during that period.
53
 Over the same time frame, 57.5% of the mortgages acquired by Fannie Mae 
(61% for Freddie Mac) were issued to mortgagors with FICO scores below 620 while 62% of 
Fannie Mae‘s mortgage procurement (58% for Freddie Mac) had a loan-to-value ratio greater 
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than 90%.
54
  Furthermore, between 2001 and 2006, the annual number of originated loans 
increased by a factor of four, while the average loan size almost doubled. During the same 
period, the use of fixed-rate mortgages declined from 33.2% to 19.9%, and the mean debt-to-
income ratio of approved loan applicants broke 41%.
55
 
The shrinking subprime-prime rate spread also signaled the deteriorating quality of new 
loans. Interest rates on subprime mortgages were generally greater than those on prime 
mortgages to compensate lenders for the additional default risk associated with subprime loans. 
Amidst intensifying competition for mortgage origination, however, the subprime-prime rate 
spread decreased substantially over time, dropping from a premium of near 3.5% in 2001 to just 
above 0.75% in 2004.
56 
Likewise, the yield differential between subprime mortgages that were 
one grade apart, which had been roughly 1% until 2003, was cut in half from 2004 to 2007.
57
 
Mortgage fees also dropped from an average of 1% in 1997 to less than 0.5% in 2002.
58
 It 
appears, at least in hindsight, that lenders were no longer being sufficiently compensated for the 
additional risk inherent in subprime loans. 
Another example of reduced lending standards and supplemental cause of the upsurge in 
subprime loan issuances was the emergence of automated underwriting. New software systems 
allowed mortgage lenders to cheaply and quickly screen out the riskiest applicants while 
automatically approving the rest. At its introduction, automated underwriting was hailed by 
lenders as a great cost-saver, reducing the average closing costs of a loan by $916.
59
 But 
automation could be ―vulnerable‖, as it immediately accepted all loans that met the standards 
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input by the software users.
60
 As those standards decreased, the default risk of accepted loans 
increased. Previously mentioned Countrywide Financial employed automated underwriting to 
double the number of loans it made monthly in 2004 to 150,000.
61
 By 2007, automation software 
was being used to generate approximately 40% of all new subprime loans.
62
 Despite efficiency 
gains, however, automated underwriting programs did not verify mortgagor income or inspect 
the property under loan or exercise any type of due diligence befitting a loan officer. Losses due 
to adverse selections made in this fashion could more than offset the cost-saving benefits of the 
automation process
63
. 
Predatory Lending & Borrowing 
 Apart from the lenders and GSEs that sought to expand credit access to low-income 
families in order to placate housing discrimination, there also existed mortgage originators who 
may have targeted subprime borrowers for less noble reasons. Abusive loan practices that 
benefited lenders to the detriment of mortgagors were termed predatory lending. As approvals 
grew immensely, it appeared that many of the terms were structured to result in ―seriously 
disproportionate‖ net harm to borrowers. Examples included 1) loans made without regard to a 
borrower‘s ability to repay, 2) loans with fees and interest rates in excess proportion to the risk 
presented by the borrowers, 3) fraudulent or deceptive loans based on inflated appraisals or 
empty promises of future, less costly refinancing, 4) loans that included mandatory arbitration 
clauses, which prevented borrowers from seeking legal redress through the court system, and 5) 
exploitative collection methods and unjustified fees during repayment.
64
 Even prior to signing, 
some lenders deliberately withheld their rate sheets and other pricing information from 
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customers, which impeded comparison shopping.
65
 Incentives to generate increased loan 
volumes explained the somewhat counterintuitive practice of making loans to borrowers that 
could not pay back the lender,
66
 as did the belief that house prices would continue to rise, 
permitting lenders to recoup more than their principal by selling foreclosed properties at a profit 
while assessing additional fees as part of the foreclosure process.
67
 One instance of predatory 
lending that garnered national attention occurred in Baltimore and was perpetrated by Wells 
Fargo Bank, which targeted predominately African-American neighborhoods with ―toxic‖ loans 
that were allegedly ―designed to fail‖ and that resulted in foreclosures. A former loan officer 
admitted to earning over $700,000 in a year for carrying out the firm‘s corporate policy of 
lending to ill-equipped minority borrowers at unreasonable expense or under false pretenses.
68
  
Yet lenders were not solely to blame for loans granted to undeserving parties. There was 
also a significant incidence of mortgage application fraud, or predatory borrowing. When bad 
loans eventually went sour, it was later discovered that as much as 70% of the defaults were on 
loans with fraudulent misrepresentations on the original applications. For loans issued between 
1997 and 2006, applications with misrepresentations were five times as likely to go into 
default.
69
 Mortgage fraud was estimated to cost up to $6 billion dollars in 2005 alone.
70
 
Moreover, suspicious activity reports relating to mortgage fraud filed with the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network, an agency of the U.S. Treasury, increased by 1,411% between 1997 and 
2005.
71
 The types of fraud were not elaborate. Many borrowers simply lied about their incomes, 
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sometimes overstating the amount by a multiple of five.
72
 Others, who intended to flip a 
mortgaged home for profit, stated that they planned to live in it instead. These assertions required 
little to no documentation and went largely unchecked.
73
 
Debt Explosion and the Inevitable Subprime Implosion 
 Between governmental policies aimed at curbing housing discrimination, underwriting 
standards that were reduced in order to comply with those policies, and an expansion of 
predatory lending and borrowing practices that occurred in pursuit of profit, household debt 
ballooned. In 2003, homeowners borrowed a record $138 billion against the equity of their 
homes. In 2004, around half of low-income families were spending at least 50% of their incomes 
on housing.
74
 By 2009, interest payments alone consumed nearly 15% of the after-tax income of 
American households.
75
 What‘s more, mortgage debt grew at a greater clip than home values. 
While the average ratio of homeowners‘ equity compared to market value remained above 67% 
through the 1980s and around 61% over the next two decades, it fell to 55% in the mid-2000s.
76
  
 Eventually, many of the country‘s massively leveraged households could no longer afford 
to make their monthly mortgage payments and defaulted on their home loans. By the third 
quarter of 2007, 42% of adjustable rate and 12% of fixed rate subprime mortgages had begun the 
foreclosure process.
77
 When borrowers failed to pay, the mortgage originators who had lent them 
money were forced to absorb sizable losses. American Business Financial Services, which had 
lent a billion dollars in its penultimate year, filed for bankruptcy protection in January 2005 
while Merit Financial, which had originated $2 billion from 2001 to 2006, fired 80% of its 
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employees in May 2006.
78
 New Century Financial, the nation‘s second largest subprime lender, 
which had also sold many its mortgages to securitizers, announced in February 2007 that it 
would restate earnings for the first three quarters of 2006 because its allowance for recourse 
obligations (the expected amount of mortgages it would be contractually compelled to 
repurchase due to defaults) was grossly insufficient.
79
 Over the next two months it was forced to 
stop originating new loans altogether and declared bankruptcy.
80
 HSBC, the largest subprime 
lender, faced similar struggles, announcing loan impairment provisions of $10.6 billion for 2006 
and $16 billion for 2007.
81
 
 
III. SECURITIZATION & STRUCTURED FINANCE 
 Had mortgage lenders been the only parties with exposure to the subprime loan market, 
the extent of the credit crisis might have been significantly reduced. Accompanying the rising 
popularity of subprime loans, however, were new structured finance products that enabled many 
other market players to capitalize on the risky notes, which had been repackaged into supposedly 
safer securities that could be purchased and traded. Of course, the actual risk of subprime 
positions turned out to be great, and when the market for subprime loans imploded, government-
sponsored enterprises that had issued mortgage-backed securities, investment banks that had sold 
collateralized debt obligations, insurance companies that had guaranteed those obligations, and 
investors who purchased them could no longer unload them in a frozen credit market and were 
all forced to post substantial losses. 
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Mortgage-Backed Securities 
 As previously mentioned, government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae & 
Freddie Mac were instrumental in providing liquidity through secondary mortgage market 
operations. GSEs accomplished this by purchasing loans from mortgage originators and reselling 
them to investors as mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
82
 In 1970, the Government National 
Mortgage Association, another GSE, first pooled similar mortgages together and sold them as 
securities that represented claims on the mortgage payments from the pool. The mortgage 
payments then passed through to the security holders, which most commonly were institutional 
investors, wealthy individuals, and even the original lenders (who often preferred the more liquid 
version of loan assets to the actual loans).
83
 
MBS were beneficial for several reasons. First, they spread (shifted, really, as discussed 
later) default risk across a larger class of investors and removed the loans from the balance sheets 
of the lenders. This permitted mortgage originators to earn fee income from their underwriting 
activities without being directly exposed to the inherent risk of the loans. Second, purchasers of 
MBS gained access to more liquid and more diversified mortgage assets. While individual loans 
required large amounts of principal and lengthy time commitments and could be risky in 
isolation, MBS offered small pieces of groups of loans, which could be freely traded. Third, 
GSEs were able to obtain vast sources of capital to finance their continued purchases of 
mortgages, maintaining liquidity in the secondary mortgage markets and encouraging lending by 
creditors. Lastly, because MBS were issued by GSEs, GSEs earned guarantee fees, and the 
securities carried the implicit guarantee of the United States government.
84
 
 
                                                     
82
 ―Mortgage-Backed Securities‖ 
83
 Dodd 
84
 ―Why Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Continue To Cost US Taxpayers Billions‖ 
20 
 
Private-Label Securities 
Securitization became the prevailing tool for the diversification and liquidation of 
mortgage loans, and its success prompted intense competition from other financial institutions. 
Indeed, the share of MBS issued by GSEs, which stood at a dominant 76% in 2003, fell to 43% 
in 2006 due to the growth of private-label securities issued by major Wall Street firms.
85
 Top 
issuers of private-label MBS included mortgage firm Countrywide Financial as well as 
investment banks Lehman Brothers and Wells Fargo.
86
 Unlike MBS issued by GSEs, private-
label issuances were not backed by the government, and they were not limited to including only 
mortgages that conformed to federal requirements. This meant that private-label issuers could 
issue MBS that represented claims on subprime and other risky loans, but it also became 
necessary for the firms to develop methods for counteracting the elevated risk in order to 
convince investors to purchase the securities. One way that financial institutions shielded 
investors, at least cosmetically, from the risk of the underlying mortgages of MBS was through 
overcollateralization. In this example of ―credit enhancement‖, the principal amount of the pool 
of mortgages exceeded the principal value of the issued securities. Another credit enhancement 
technique, known as excess spread, occurred when the interest payments on the underlying 
mortgages exceeded the payments offered to purchasers of MBS.
87
 The excess was first used to 
cover default losses, and if any spread was left, it could be used to build up a cushion against 
future losses or to pay down the principal on senior bonds.
88
 
Unquestionably the most popular tool for creating an apparently sheltered security out of 
more vulnerable components was structured securitization, whereby underlying mortgages were 
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separated into different levels, called tranches, which were prioritized in how they absorbed 
losses from the underlying portfolio. The senior tranche, at the top, was perceived to be the least 
risky because it held first claim to mortgage payments and was protected from losses by the 
tranches below it. As such, it offered the lowest interest rates. Any payments remaining after the 
senior tranche requirements were fulfilled flowed to the junior, or mezzanine, tranche below it, 
which earned slightly greater interest due to the greater likelihood of shortfalls. The bottom, or 
equity, tranche—often referred to as ―toxic waste‖—was the first to absorb losses and thus 
presented the greatest amount of risk, but successful performance by this tranche‘s underlying 
assets could lead to high returns for investors. When losses did occur, they hit the lowest tranche 
first until it was completely eroded; additional losses were directed at the mezzanine and finally 
senior tranches.
 
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which pooled hundreds of individual 
tranches from MBS, allowed investment banks to tailor securities with differing risk-return 
profiles to different investors.
89
 
A mathematical example helps to illustrate just how such structured securitization, or 
subordination, could alleviate concerns of default risk among investors. Consider a scenario in 
which a security contains a pool of just two loans, each with a face value of $1 and with a 
probability of default of 10%. One loan represents the junior tranche and will absorb the first $1 
of losses such that it will pay out $1 if both loans avoid default but $0 if either defaults. The 
other loan represents the senior tranche and will only fail to pay out if both loans default. In this 
example, the senior tranche will pay out either $1 or $0—the same as the underlying 
mortgages—but, if the two probabilities of default are uncorrelated, the likelihood that the senior 
tranche will fail to pay out is less than that of either loan by itself (1% vs. 10%). As more 
securities are added to the mortgage pool, an increasingly greater fraction of tranches will have a 
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lower probability of default than the average loan component. For instance, if a third bond is 
added to the example, also with a 10% probability of default, and if the probabilities are 
uncorrelated, the senior tranche will only fail to pay out if all three loans default, or 0.1% of the 
time (0.1
3
); the middle tranche will only fail to pay out if two or more loans default, or 2.8% of 
the time (3C2 * 0.1
2
 * 0.9 + 0.001), much less often than the 19% (1 – 0.92) default incidence of 
the second bond in the previous example; and the bottom tranche will fail to pay out if any of the 
loans default, or on 27.1% of occasions (1 – 0.93). And so, through the magic of subordination, 
two-thirds of the issuance is repackaged into securities that appear significantly less risky than 
the underlying loans.
90
 As MBS often contained thousands of mortgages and CDOs contained 
hundreds of MBS, the percentage of seemingly low-risk tranches grew ever closer to 100%, and 
securities that were backed by BBB components earned AAA ratings.
91
 
Risk Sharing vs. Risk Shifting 
Of course, these examples rest on an important assumption—that the probabilities of 
default for the underlying mortgages are uncorrelated. This notion simply may not hold true. 
Granted, the type of diversification offered by MBS can produce risk-reducing benefits when the 
underlying risk is random. For instance, a home insurance company might diversify 
geographically among policyholders to protect itself from the risk of a particular house burning 
down since the likelihood of all insured houses catching fire simultaneously is infinitesimal. Risk 
of default, on the other hand, can be much more systematic than risk of fire. Because mortgage 
loans implicitly contain a put option that allows a borrower to sell a home back to the lender 
when its value falls below the value of the mortgage, defaults often increase as house prices 
decline. Prices tend not to decline in isolation, though, as the decline in value of one house can 
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signal general problems that will similarly affect the values of surrounding houses.
92
 As such, the 
probability of default for loans comprising MBS were likely correlated, and the benefits of 
diversification were likely overstated. The deteriorating quality of subprime loans within MBS 
augmented further the prospect of default. 
Returning to the home insurance company example, when a single house is destroyed due 
to fire, an insurer can use the proceeds from other insurance premiums to cover the loss, thus risk 
is shared by policyholders. In the case of default risk, however, it is more appropriate to say that 
risk is shifted, first from borrower to lender, then from lender to secondary market participants, 
then to investment banks, insurers, and investors. Even within individual MBS or CDOs, risk is 
shifted from the most senior to the junior tranches. Because risk could be passed on to the next 
party at each stage of securitization, less incentive existed for loan originators and purchasers to 
exercise due diligence regarding borrower quality or appropriateness of credit instruments. And 
as we will see, credit rating agencies did a poor job assessing the true risk of MBS, allowing 
securitizers to sell them at prices that did not reflect the issuer‘s lack of attentiveness. Mortgage 
originators and investment banks thus had incentive and opportunity to cherry-pick loans while 
leaving the worst to investors. Countrywide Financial President Stanford Kurland confessed, 
―We‘re looking to hold only pristine product on the balance sheet.‖93 Such information 
asymmetry created problems for investors, who could not examine loan applications firsthand 
but who relied on the representations of issuers regarding the credit quality of borrowers. 
Other particularly egregious risk-shifting tools including special purpose entities and 
structured investment vehicles enabled banks and lenders to move the risk of the underlying 
loans so that it was virtually invisible to outsiders. In fact, these conduits fell under the umbrella 
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aptly called ―structured finance‖ because transactions were structured to isolate loan pools from 
the original lenders or purchasers. In this process, mortgage originators and investment banks 
established offshore entities that were owned by, but legally distinct from, the creators.
94
 Due to 
the alleged independence of these entities, their assets and liabilities were kept separate from the 
balance sheets of the sponsoring institutions. Conduits allowed the banks to sidestep capital 
reserve requirements and invest more heavily in MBS and CDOs.
95
 
Was this accounting treatment appropriate? Well, to assure investors of the soundness of 
these entities, the establishing banks often committed to provide them with liquidity (in 
extraordinary amounts) in case of need. While the commitments were not required to be shown 
on a backer‘s balance sheet if its management considered it unlikely that the promises would be 
called upon, it seems clear now that banks and lenders had provided at least implicit guarantees 
regarding the health of subsidiaries under their ownership.
96
 At the end of 2008, off-balance-
sheet assets at the country‘s four largest banks—Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, 
and Wells Fargo—totaled $5.2 trillion.97 Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince infamously declared: 
―When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will get complicated. But as long as the 
music is playing, you‘ve got to get up and dance. We‘re still dancing.‖98 Other dancers, issuers 
and investors alike, were caught unawares when the commitments were revealed to be large 
enough to bankrupt many of the sponsoring banks. 
Over-Exposure 
Some investment banks did realize that they were the lenders of last resort for their 
private-label issuances, which were not secured by the federal government. So to shift the risk 
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burden one step further, issuers purchased credit default swaps (CDS) from insurers to protect 
their MBS, CDOs, and SIVs. Sellers of CDS, in exchange for a premium, agreed to reimburse a 
contract holder that suffered losses to its underlying assets and conferred the insurer‘s own credit 
rating onto those assets. While CDS may have resolved, on the face of it, the matter of liability 
for individual banks, the financial instruments created deeper problems for the credit market at 
large. First, many CDS were offered as unregulated derivatives, which meant that guarantors 
were not subject to the same capital requirements as monoline insurers and commitments greatly 
exceeded the funds available to fulfill them. Also, CDS, like the securities they insured, could be 
traded in over-the-counter markets with prices reflecting the perceived financial health of the 
underlying assets. Moreover, the ―insurable interest‖ requirement, which limits most insurance 
policies to parties that would be negatively affected by damage to the insured object, did not 
apply, thus CDS shifted the focus of insurance contracts from protecting against loss to creating 
opportunities for speculative gains. Multiple contracts could be purchased for the same 
underlying asset, and the resulting overlap produced investors with significantly greater exposure 
to loans than actually existed. At the end of 2008, the CDS market was valued at $67 trillion, but 
the value of the component loans was only $15 trillion!
99
 
 As previously discussed, an increasing number of those loans significantly deteriorated in 
quality, and when borrowers defaulted and mortgage originators went bankrupt, it spelled 
disaster for everyone with exposure to subprime holdings. At the same time, lenders and banks 
that had failed to disclose certain assets and liabilities realized enormous losses when failing 
notes and obligations to SIVs appeared on their balance sheets. In October 2007 Merrill Lynch 
reported a $7.9 billion loss on subprime positions and a $5.8 billion loss on its senior (the safest 
tranche) CDOs. A month later, Citigroup announced a $1.8 billion loss, to which it added at least 
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$8 billion in a subsequent disclosure. What‘s more, sellers of CDS were now liable for large 
sums that did not exist. In the first quarter of 2008, two major loan insurers, Ambac and MBIA 
announced losses of $5.2 and $3.5 billion, respectively. The fate of these companies, which had 
guaranteed $2 trillion of debt, raised concerns of rapid contagion due to interdependency.
100
 
Later that year, prominent investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy 
protection due to debts of over $600 billion, marking the largest bankruptcy in United States 
history.
101
 In bankruptcy examinations, it was discovered that Lehman had allegedly shifted $50 
billion in troubled assets off its balance sheet to conceal the firm‘s true financial condition by 
employing what has been called a Repo 105 maneuver. A repo, or repurchase agreement, occurs 
when a borrower uses securities as collateral for a cash loan, which when fully paid back, 
triggers the return of the securities to the borrower. Lehman, however, was able to avoid treating 
such transactions as repos and to give the appearance of permanently ridding itself of failing 
assets by narrowly tailoring the arrangements to satisfy the requirements of a sales deal. To 
qualify for sales treatment, a firm must prove that it no longer controls the securities being 
exchanged, usually by trading securities of significantly greater value than the cash received, 
since it would be perceived as unlikely that the firm could or would buy them back. Accounting 
guidance suggests that an exchange of securities in excess of 102% of the cash value denotes a 
lack of control, thus Lehman structured its repo transactions at a level of 105%. However, it was 
later revealed that the firm had no economic reason for doing so and that it had consistently used 
a standard 105% level regardless of the deal, seemingly indicating that there existed a concerted 
effort to disguise inevitable repurchases of volatile assets as permanent sales.
102
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New discoveries have also surfaced that some asset-backed securities were intentionally 
arranged to fail, much to the dismay of unsuspecting investors. As recently as April 2010, the 
SEC charged investment bank Goldman Sachs with fraud relating to the structuring and 
marketing of CDOs tied to subprime mortgages. The complaint alleges that the investment bank 
failed to disclose fundamental information about some of its CDOs to investors, particularly the 
role that a major hedge fund played in the portfolio selection process and the fact that the hedge 
fund had taken a short position against the securities. Paulson & Co., one of the world‘s largest 
hedge funds, purportedly paid Goldman Sachs to structure a transaction in which Paulson could 
bet against mortgage securities that it had chosen based on their expected failure. With 
knowledge of Paulson‘s undisclosed short interest, Goldman executives deliberately misled 
institutional investors to purchase the CDOs now under investigation.
103
 
 
IV. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
 How did we end up here? What would cause banks to acquire and securitize mortgage 
loans of deteriorating quality? Why would investors purchase securities that they did not fully 
understand? Where were the minds of insurers, who provided guarantees that greatly exceeded 
their ability to follow through? Who was responsible for leading rational parties to make such 
irrational yet enormous decisions? Certainly some fault must lie with the credit rating agencies, 
whose ultimately flawed ratings stamped seals of approval on poor investments and propped up 
the market for structured finance products by understating the inherent risk of mortgage-backed 
securities and their components. A lack of competition, the absence of transparency, and 
apparent conflicts of interest contributed to inaccurate or misleading ratings and poorly served 
users who had relied on the rating services. 
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The Gatekeepers 
 The primary function of credit rating agencies (CRAs) is to assess the creditworthiness 
and the debt obligations of companies and their issuances. CRAs issue alphabetic credit ratings, 
which represent opinions on the future ability, legal obligation, and willingness of obligors to 
make full and timely payments on principal and interest to investors. Like public accounting and 
securities research firms, CRAs facilitate the raising of capital by providing to individual 
investors an independent, low-cost source of information regarding the reliability of issuers of 
securities. Credit ratings greatly influence the decisions of investors in fixed-income vehicles and 
determine the ability of issuers to obtain financing. By serving such a verification function, 
CRAs have become known as external gatekeepers who act as reputational intermediaries by 
evaluating issuers in order to protect outside investors.
104
 
 When gatekeepers perform their jobs well, they provide a useful service of pairing 
investors with risk-appropriate instruments and keeping conservative portfolios free of toxic 
components. Time, of course, has revealed that CRAs were notoriously inept at fulfilling this 
role. Beginning in early 2007, increasing delinquencies on subprime mortgages raised concerns 
about the ability of CRAs to accurately assess the quality of securitized obligations in the 
structured finance market.
105
 The President‘s Working Group on Financial Markets would later 
issue a policy statement identifying faulty ratings as one of the principal causes of financial 
market turmoil.
106
 Likewise, the Financial Stability Forum blamed poor credit assessments for 
both the buildup and the unfolding of the crisis.
107
 Indeed, as a result of the initial severe 
underestimation of credit risks, recent changes in CRA ratings have been much more volatile and 
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weighted toward downgrades than the historical record.
108
 Between Moody‘s and Standard & 
Poor‘s, the world‘s two largest CRAs, $322 billion in mortgage securities were downgraded in 
the last two quarters of 2007, and $1.58 trillion were downgraded in the first half of 2008.
109
 
Dissatisfaction with perceived CRA incompetence led PIMCO (manager of the world‘s largest 
mutual fund) analyst Bill Gross to scold rating agencies for being foolishly wooed by ―good 
looking‖ but far from ―high-class‖ instruments bearing ―tramp stamp[s]‖.110 
 Despite their apparent lack of foresight, the ratings issued by CRAs effectively buoyed 
the securitization market, which in turn provided much of their business. As structured finance 
products became more advanced, unsophisticated investors required quality assurance about the 
inherent complexity. For this reason, it became an axiom that ―securitization is, and always has 
been, a rating-driven product.‖111 So crucial to the proliferation of structured products were the 
credit ratings of CRAs that Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Thomas Friedman remarked: ―There 
are two superpowers in the world today…there‘s the United States and there‘s Moody‘s Bond 
Rating Service…and believe me, it‘s not clear sometimes who‘s more powerful.‖112 At the same 
time that issuers were obviously dependent upon rating agencies, CRAs possessed an ―enormous 
amount of self-interest vested in keeping the structured finance machine going‖.113 CRAs offered 
up guidance on the more complex vehicles at a premium, charging almost three times as much 
for ratings of securitized loans and derivatives than for ordinary corporate bond work. Moreover, 
these ratings represented the largest business and growth driver for Fitch Ratings and accounted 
for 40% of Moody‘s revenues.114 In effect, CRAs transitioned from gatekeepers to ―gate 
                                                     
108
 Utzig 
109
 ―The woman who called Wall Street‘s meltdown‖ 
110
 Gross 
111
 Kettering 
112
 ―Free Market Society‖ 
113
 ―Finding a Way Out of the Rating Agency Morass‖ 
114
 Alam 
30 
 
openers‖, issuing ratings that created and sustained a multi-trillion dollar structured finance 
market.
115
 
Causes of Low-Quality Ratings: Lack of Competition 
 The market for credit ratings has historically been directed by two major players, 
Moody‘s and Standard & Poor‘s, with Fitch trailing in a distant third until recently. Together, the 
three firms control around 98% of the entire rating agency business and issue more than 99% of 
ratings for asset-backed and government securities.
116
 Such astounding market concentration has 
led economists to describe the credit rating industry as ―curiously devoid of competition and 
oversight‖.117 The problem has been compounded by what has been ingrained as a two-rating 
norm, whereby standard practice for issuers of securities dictates obtaining ratings from two 
different firms on each issue, the default pair almost always being Moody‘s and Standard & 
Poor‘s.118 This measure means that the largest two CRAs have effectively no need to compete for 
business and have been able to construct a ―partner monopoly‖.119 Such lack of competition has 
resulted in the prominent CRAs employing generally similar (and ultimately flawed) rating 
methodologies, not surprisingly attaining identical results, with little use for differing or 
inventive approaches.
120
 Moreover, accusations of anticompetitive practices have been levied at 
Moody‘s and Standard & Poor‘s by Fitch, which asserted that its older siblings had colluded in 
attempting to squeeze it out of the structured finance market. The two giants had allegedly 
engaged in notching, which involved lowering their ratings of or refusing to rate certain asset 
pools unless the firms were recruited to rate a substantial portion of the assets in those pools.
121
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 How did the CRAs achieve their dominant positions in the first place? In 1975, the SEC 
established a significant barrier to entry for the rating agency market by creating the designation 
of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs).
122
 It became essential for any 
firm wishing to become a viable CRA to first earn this title, which was viewed as the mark of a 
real rating agency, but for which the approval process was considered ―unnecessarily 
cumbersome and insufficiently transparent‖.123 The original NRSROs—Moody‘s, Standard & 
Poor‘s, and Fitch—were still the only three firms to hold the designation almost thirty years 
later, despite the dramatic increase in global reliance on credit ratings.
124
 CRAs also benefited 
from heavily rating-dependent regulation. At least forty-four of the SEC‘s rules require the use 
of credit ratings, the banking regulatory system calls for rating agencies to measure asset risk, 
pension plans under the framework set by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 must be assessed by NRSROs, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners‘ 
Securities Valuation Office uses ratings to monitor insurance companies, and many state laws 
and banking regulations compel the same. Likewise, ratings became just as hard-wired in private 
arrangements, as minimum weighted average rating requirements and rating triggers emerged as 
popular elements of private contracts.
125
 The ubiquity of ratings in financial regulation and 
industry practice multiplied the demand for the service while the coveted label of NRSRO 
reinforced the notion that only a select trio of agencies was qualified to complete the work. As 
regulation, rather than reputation, became a fundamental source of business for CRAs, the big 
firms experienced continued prosperity, even in the face of poor performance.
126
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Causes of Low-Quality Ratings: Rating Transparency 
 Another vulnerability of CRAs concerns the transparency of their rating methodologies—
that is, the ability of outsiders to view and comprehend the models used in the rating process and 
to discern just how the agencies arrive at the ratings they impart. Even after the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act of 2006, passed in part to address such fears of opacity, CRAs were still 
only required to provide a description of rating procedures and methodologies, as opposed to 
disclosing substantive information on actual methods and models.
127
 Consequently, ratings 
criteria often omitted important variables and assumptions and were not released ―up to a level of 
replicability.‖128 When agency methodologies were disclosed, they often turned out to be 
erroneous or outdated. One CRA compliance officer, in discussing how his firm‘s actual 
processes for determining credit ratings diverged from its stated criteria, revealed: 
Our published criteria as it currently stands is a bit too unwieldy and all over the 
map in terms of being current or comprehensive. It might be too much of a stretch 
to say that we’re complying with it because our SF [structured finance] rating 
approach is inherently flexible and subjective, while much of our written criteria 
is detailed and prescriptive. Doing a complete inventory of our criteria and 
documenting all of the areas where it is out of date or inaccurate would appear to 
be a huge job.
129
 
Issues regarding performance transparency also existed. Many CRAs did not publish 
verifiable or easily comparable historical data on rating performance, making it difficult for 
customers to assess the accuracy of past ratings.
130
 Without informed views on the quality of a 
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firm‘s credit ratings, users could not reasonably rely on them to make the investments they did. 
Of course, for reasons previously stated—lack of competition among rating agencies, regulation 
and industry practices that were dependent on ratings, etc.—it appears they had little choice. 
On the flipside, while information pertaining to CRA credit ratings were not fully 
transparent to their end users, rating agencies regularly supplied clients (the issuers of the 
securities being rated) with various ―customer end‖ tools, which enabled them to run tests of 
proposed securitization portfolios based on guidelines provided prior to rating. As long as an 
issuer‘s offering adhered to the criteria in a relevant model, it could earn the desired rating, 
regardless of any additional risk beyond the scope of the model. This practice of structuring to 
rating was a dangerous one, as new issuances could be constructed with design features solely 
intended to satisfy the requirements of narrow rating tests.
131
 
Causes of Low-Quality Ratings: Conflicts of Interest 
Other conflicts of interest arose regarding the issuer-pays model. While this conflict is 
common to many gatekeepers, such as accounting firms, and not necessarily a definitive sign of 
deficient independence, it occurred to a greater extent at CRAs, who did little to manage problem 
areas. As competition dwindled and financial markets became more reliant on credit ratings, 
CRAs successfully transitioned from a subscription model, wherein investors and other users of 
rating information paid, to an arena in which issuers of securities funded their rating. Such a 
compensation scheme raises fears that clients might offer to pay more for inflated ratings or, by 
the same token, that rating agencies could threaten to issue damaging ratings unless sufficiently 
remunerated. Moreover, CRAs earned 90% of their revenues from issuer-paid ratings,
132
 in 
contrast to the Big 4 accounting firms, whose audit services account for less than half of total 
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proceeds.
133
 These concerns were exacerbated by the fact that CRAs began providing an 
increasing amount of ancillary services to their existing rating clients. In particular, all three 
NRSROs offered risk management consulting, which included credit scoring models, internal 
ratings systems services, and empirical data on default incidence, loss severity, and rating 
transitions. They also marketed pre-rating assessments, which allowed issuers, for an additional 
fee, to determine how a particular corporate action, like a merger or stock repurchase, would 
affect their credit rating.
134
 But whereas accounting and securities research firms face new rules 
and restrictions regarding such conflicts of interest, regulators did not place any limits on the 
activities of rating agencies with respect to ancillary and consulting services.
135
 
CRAs drew further negative attention by issuing unsolicited ratings. Standard & Poor‘s, 
for instance, assigned and published ratings for all debt issues over $50 million, with or without 
request from the issuer, ―as a matter of policy‖.136 There are several problems with this practice. 
Ostensibly, CRAs appeared to be offering a public service by disseminating free information to 
the investing community, and more information is generally useful in decision making. 
However, in the case of unsolicited assessments, rating agencies were limited to publicly 
available intelligence and could not have constructed ratings with the same quality as those for 
clients or securities on which they possessed inside information. In fact, research has shown that 
CRAs assign empirically lower unsolicited ratings than when hired and paid to do so.
137
 While 
such adverse opinions may result from conservative assumptions regarding confidential 
information, their publication may also serve as a ―veiled threat‖ from CRAs against issuers that 
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do not pay for their services.
138
 In order to improve or correct a rating that it never requested, an 
issuer may be obligated to hire the CRA responsible for its circulation. 
Supplementary Causes of Low-Quality Ratings 
The list of additional charges directed at rating agencies is extensive, but I will attempt to 
summarize them briefly. Perhaps the most important criticism is that CRAs asserted that ratings 
were intended to be consistent across different types of instruments, so that a rating of AAA 
should have meant the same thing whether it was attached to a corporate bond or a complex 
structured finance product. Investors may have been understandably attracted to the newer 
issuances, which bore the same grade as, but promised greater returns than, their traditional 
counterparts. The structured vehicles ultimately behaved much differently, however, with 
defaults and downgrades occurring much more frequently.
139
 Studies carried out subsequent to 
the credit crisis also revealed that CRAs had relied on flawed rating methodologies that took into 
account neither the weakening of underwriting standards nor the correlation of defaults.
140
 
Moreover, rating agencies performed inadequate due diligence concerning the quality of the 
collateral pools underlying the rated securities, basing their findings on historical mortgage 
default rates for similar pools instead of evaluating mortgages individually. This historical data 
quickly became irrelevant as defaults reached unprecedented levels.
141
 At the same time, 
institutional investors with the capacity to undertake their own credit analysis did not 
independently examine structured products prior to investment, instead placing excessive 
reliance on CRAs without fully understanding their methodologies.
142
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Lastly, rating agencies possessed little incentive to ensure quality ratings because they 
were largely able to escape liability. CRAs repeatedly asserted that their evaluations were 
constitutionally protected opinions, and courts accepted this defense on numerous occasions, 
implying that credit ratings could be issued without fear of litigation under the protection of the 
First Amendment. Even if a credit rating was judged to be a (false) factual assertion, plaintiff 
corporations were often considered to be public figures, which required them to show malice on 
the part of the defendant—that is, to prove that a CRA had acted with reckless disregard to the 
truth.
143
 The effective legal immunity of rating agencies is surprising given the limited degree to 
which they sought to protect against falsehoods. Moody‘s, for example, in its Code of 
Professional Conduct, described in no uncertain terms its indifference to ensuring the quality of 
its ratings: 
[Moody’s Investor Service] has no obligation to perform, and does not perform, 
due diligence with respect to the accuracy of information it receives or obtains in 
connection with the rating process. MIS does not independently verify any such 
information. Nor does MIS audit or otherwise undertake to determine that such 
information is complete. Thus, in assigning a Credit Rating, MIS is in no way 
providing a guarantee or any kind of assurance with regard to the accuracy, 
timeliness, or completeness of factual information reflected, or contained, in the 
Credit Rating or any related MIS publication.
144
 
Reasons for CRAs to sustain the structured finance market were numerous, while incentives to 
promote quality credit ratings were scarce. Investors lured by assurances of creditworthiness and 
promises of great returns ignored the considerable lack of competition and transparency and 
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looked past potential conflicts of interest, making highly leveraged purchases of precarious 
securities. Then, well, you know the rest. 
 
V. DEREGULATION & FEDERAL OVERSIGHT 
 Much of what led to the bursting of the housing bubble and resulting devaluation of 
asset-backed securities likely could have been prevented if certain actions had been prohibited by 
law or at least closely monitored by those appointed to keep watch. Instead, regulators and 
overseers elected to take a backseat in their supervisory roles, permitting unregulated credit 
markets to produce and trade exotic mortgage products to the point where leverage surpassed 
historic levels. First, Congress issued several edicts gradually returning more power to the parties 
responsible for previous financial crises. Moreover, it repealed landmark legislation that had 
been passed in response to the Great Depression and was intended to prevent familiar speculative 
excesses that had been at the core of that banking failure. In addition, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission allowed the largest investment banks to greatly increase their exposure to 
structured finance products by reducing capital requirements and amplifying leverage. Finally, 
legislators sanctioned self-regulation of over-the-counter derivatives, triggering precipitous 
growth of the market for credit default swaps. 
The Origins of Regulation & Financial Amnesia 
 The collapse of the United States stock market in 1929 and subsequent contagion to the 
worldwide economy over the following decade convinced legislators that unregulated financial 
markets could not be trusted to ensure economic stability and that the government should closely 
monitor major financial institutions to prevent the excessive risk taking characteristic of 
damaging boom and bust periods. In 1933, therefore, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
38 
 
signed into law the Glass-Steagall Act, which separated the activities of investment and 
commercial banks. Specifically, the act sought to prevent the use of banking deposits to finance 
speculative capital market activity. The SEC was tasked with regulating investment banks by 
requiring the publication of complete and dependable securities information. Moreover, 
commercial banks were obligated to retain the consumer and commercial loans that they had 
originated, which motivated them to avoid risky lending practices.
145
 
 Not surprisingly, as often happens after enough time elapses, memories of the reasons 
behind the Great Depression faded, and serious policy discussions on the advantages of liberal 
financial markets and innovative instruments commenced.
146
 Post-Keynesian macroeconomist 
James Crotty conjectures that catastrophic economic and political events often lead to successful 
attempts to tightly regulate the industries deemed responsible, but regulated firms ultimately 
possess a strong incentive to try to weaken and evade their regulatory restraints.
147
 And so, over 
the course of two decades of deregulation beginning in the 1980s, the United States grew into its 
―new financial architecture‖ (NFA), one in which regulations were nonexistent, loosely enforced, 
or designed favorably for financial institutions.
148
 Proponents of the NFA argued that capital 
markets price securities correctly with respect to expected risk and return, enabling participants 
to make optimal decisions and leading risk to be held only by those capable of managing it, 
negating the need for significant government intervention.
149
 But this defense ignores the lessons 
of history and rests on the now discredited assumption that all market players have access to all 
information. As we have seen, securitization masked the extent of risk inherent to investments in 
subprime loans, off-balance-sheet conduits concealed toxic assets from shareholders, and credit 
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rating agencies did little to squelch conflicts of interest that disincentivized the formation of 
high-quality ratings. Indeed, in testimony before the House of Representatives Oversight 
Committee, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan admitted that he and ―those of us 
who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions‖ found themselves in a ―state of 
shocked disbelief‖ when confronted with the failing reality of the NFA.150 
The Beginnings of Deregulation 
 Without the benefit of hindsight, legislators pushed ahead with their deregulation efforts 
and in 1980 first set their sights on residential mortgage credit. At the time, policies aimed at 
increasing the availability of credit seemed prudent. Annual inflation had climbed to 13.5% 
(compared to an average of 2.6% from 2000 to 2009),
151
 mortgage interest rates towered at 
13.74% (vs. 6.29% throughout the most recent decade),
152
 and states with strict usury limits 
made credit conditions even tighter.
153
 Congress responded by passing the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which phased out government 
imposed interest rate ceilings on first lien home mortgages, effectively repealing usury caps 
imposed by individual states.
154
 Soon after, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 
1982 authorized the use of adjustable rate mortgages, balloon clauses, and negative amortization 
loans and accorded to all mortgage financiers parity with federally chartered lenders.
155
 
Together, these two acts created an environment in which even the riskiest of loan features could 
be legally implemented to obscure the total cost of a loan.
156
 Exotic mortgages set buyers up for 
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significant payment shock by requiring small payments to start while the newly dismantled 
interest rate prohibitions could offer no protection against excessive resets. 
 Remaining tools for federal oversight were ineffective or underutilized, including two 
laws designed to promote transparency in lending arrangements. The Truth in Lending Act of 
1968, which had been enacted to protect consumers and enhance competition among creditors by 
requiring uniform disclosures regarding loan costs, and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures 
Act of 1974, passed with similar intent, have both been criticized for failing to ensure informed 
comparison shopping due to the decreasing relevance of the required disclosures.
157
 In 1994, 
Congress attempted to remedy some of its perceived regulatory weaknesses by ratifying the 
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA). One of the law‘s chief 
objectives was to temper the distribution of high-cost loans, which it endeavored to accomplish 
by banning balloon payments and prepayment penalties, but the scope of loans affected by the 
act was limited.
158
 First, HOEPA applied only to non-purchase money transactions, which 
included home refinancing but not first time home purchases, reverse mortgages, or home equity 
lines of credit.
159
 This meant that new subprime borrowers could still be subjected to the abuses 
that HOEPA sought to eliminate. In addition, lenders found ways to circumvent the high-cost 
loan provisions by slightly lowering interest rates and fees to below HOEPA‘s thresholds.160 
Former Federal Reserve Governor Edward Gramlich revealed that although it was expected that 
half of all subprime mortgage loans would be brought under HOEPA coverage, in reality the act 
only covered one percent of the loan population.
161
 HOEPA did provide other, more expansive 
means for policing lending practices. Specifically, it granted the Federal Reserve with a broad 
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authority to prohibit unfair or deceptive loan terms in both the purchase and refinance markets, 
regardless of interest rates or fees.
162
 Nevertheless, Chairman Greenspan declined to exercise that 
authority.
163
 Criticism regarding the Fed‘s reluctance to intervene led Ben Bernanke, 
Greenspan‘s successor, to finally implement comprehensive restrictions on loan abuses in 2008, 
long after problems with subprime loans had become apparent.
164
 
 While federal regulators remained on the sidelines, many states enacted their own statutes 
for keeping checks on the mortgage market. Before long, however, just like with what had 
happened to state restrictions on usury and alternative mortgage products, the new statutes were 
federally preempted. In 1996, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the federal branch 
responsible for regulating thrift institutions, opined that federal savings and loan associations 
were exempt from observing state lending laws.
165
 The decision did not relieve national banks, 
state thrifts, or independent nonbank mortgage lenders from state directives, though, and these 
institutions were increasingly targeted beginning in 1999 when North Carolina introduced 
comprehensive anti-predatory lending legislation.
166
 Georgia and thirty other states followed suit, 
each passing a version of a HOEPA-fix that expanded coverage and imposed more stringent 
restrictions on lender behavior.
167
 But in 2004, as perhaps should have been expected, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the regulator of national banks and non-thrifts, issued 
a proclamation declaring that its member firms, too, were not bound by state laws.
168
 It should be 
noted that the revenues of OTS and OCC derive almost exclusively from the entities that they 
regulate, thus both agencies had an incentive to appease their constituent institutions through 
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federal preemption for fear that a federal thrift might defect to national bank status or vice 
versa.
169
 At any rate, the decision to favor federal regulations over state rulings would not have 
been so contentious had federal regulators enforced comparable guidelines or provided the same 
level of oversight. Instead, the OTS merely issued non-binding advisory letters that were 
routinely dismissed as ―suggestions‖.170 The sole rule adopted by the OCC, meanwhile, which 
prohibited the issuance of mortgage loans to unqualified borrowers, turned out to be vague in 
design and execution.
171
 In the words of Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chairman Phil 
Angelides, federal regulators ―tied the hands of the states‖ and then ―sat on [their own] 
hands.‖172 
The Makings of a Crisis 
 While lack of oversight can be challenging to prove, federal agencies also made three 
verifiable changes to the financial landscape that have been linked to the recent crisis. First, at 
the turn of the millennium, President Clinton certified the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999, repealing the section of the Glass-Steagall Act that had 
mandated the separation of commercial and investment banking activities.
173
 Recall that Glass-
Steagall was drafted in response to the Great Depression, which resulted partly from the ill-
advised investment of banking deposits. Nevertheless, in a study requisitioned by Congress to 
consider whether the separation should be upheld, the case against preserving Glass-Steagall 
contended: ―The securities activities that depository institutions are seeking are both low-risk by 
their very nature, and would reduce the total risk of organizations offering them -- by 
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diversification.‖174 Hopefully this claim has been sufficiently debunked. Nobel Prize winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz added that repeal of Glass-Steagall led to a significant culture change: 
Commercial banks are not supposed to be high-risk ventures; they are supposed 
to manage other people’s money very conservatively. It is with this understanding 
that the government agrees to pick up the tab should they fail. Investment banks, 
on the other hand, have traditionally managed rich people’s money, people who 
can take bigger risks in order to get bigger returns. When repeal of Glass-
Steagall brought investment and commercial banks together, the investment-bank 
culture came out on top.
175
 
Following passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, that culture change manifested itself in the form of 
several enormous mergers that either occurred for the first time (Bank of America with Fleet 
Bank) or were made permanent (Citibank with Smith Barney, Shearson, Primerica, and Travelers 
Insurance), creating massive financial services companies with access to capital through means 
other than traditional bank deposits, like borrowing. 
 And borrow those conglomerates did. In fact, the second concrete step taken by 
regulators that led to the excesses responsible for the crisis was the SEC‘s 2004 decision to relax 
its rule setting minimum capital requirements for certain investment banks. Before the 
amendment, broker-dealers were subject to stringent rules limiting leverage ratios to no more 
than 15:1.
176
 The change, however, permitted broker-dealers that were part of consolidated 
supervised entities to adopt voluntary, alternative methods of computing deductions to net capital 
using internal mathematical models.
177
 Leverage ratios limit how much debt a company may 
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assume for every dollar it has in equity. Lower leverage ratios and higher capital requirements 
mean that firms must maintain more resources for buffering against losses, but the new net 
capital rule allowed investment banks with assets in excess of $5 billion and that consented to 
SEC supervision to unshackle funds previously held in reserve.
178
 Unfortunately, the SEC 
eventually conceded that the results of its rule change ―made it abundantly clear that voluntary 
regulation does not work.‖179 The country‘s largest investment banks, meanwhile, took full 
advantage of the modification and began piling on debt. Merrill Lynch‘s debt-to-equity ratio, for 
instance, nearly doubled from 15:1 in 2003 to 28:1 in 2007 while the leverage ratios of Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs grew to 33:1 and 28:1, respectively.
180
 By 2008, each of the five 
biggest broker-dealers had either met its demise or neared collapse. Bear Stearns received a $29 
billion bailout and was sold for cheap to JPMorgan, Merrill Lynch sold itself to Bank of 
America, Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
converted to commercial bank status to gain permanent access to the Fed‘s discount window.181 
 Hard times were made worse because the firms had used their extremely leveraged 
positions to purchase highly speculative instruments, notably credit default swaps, which were 
traded to insure mortgage-backed securities. CDS are derivatives with features of commodities, 
securities, and insurance, but Congress and regulatory agencies have created exceptions 
exempting CDS from any of those regulatory regimes. In 1989, 1992, and 1993, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission first approved rules to excuse some swaps from commodities 
regulation.
182
 Years later, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 clarified that the 
derivatives would be regulated as neither futures under the Commodities Exchange Act nor 
                                                     
178
 ―Ex-SEC Official Blames Agency for Blow-Up of Broker-Dealers‖ 
179
 ―S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse‖ 
180
 ―Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis‖ 
181
 ―Agency‘s ‘04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt‖ 
182
 ―Statement Concerning the CFTC and SEC Agreements with Bankers Trust‖ 
45 
 
securities under federal securities law.
183
 Interestingly, the act was backed by Senator Phil 
Gramm, who was also co-sponsor of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and who, according to federal 
records, was the top recipient of campaign contributions from commercial banks and in the top 
five for donations from Wall Street from 1989 to 2002.
184
 The exemptions kept CDS out of 
exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, where a lack of a reliable central repository of 
information made it challenging for traders of CDS to determine how exposed the parties on the 
other side of the transactions were.
185
  Unchecked, the market for swaps grew sharply, nearly 
doubling in size each year from 2005 to 2008 and creating a completely interconnected financial 
arena as issuers of CDS acquired insurance of their own.
186
 CDS were ultimately to blame for the 
troubles faced by AIG, which had sold commitments of protection on roughly $500 billion worth 
of securities but which, under the terms of its sales, was not compelled to post collateral as long 
as the firm remained highly rated and the value of the underlying securities did not decline.
187
 
When AIG failed to satisfy either requirement, it lacked sufficient capital to cover margin calls 
on its CDS until it found salvation in the form of a $150 billion federal bailout.
188
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